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Holding fossil fuel companies accountable for their contribution to climate
change: Where does the law stand?
Michael Burger and Jessica Wentz
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ABSTRACT

The judge who called for a climate tutorial in a federal court in San Francisco accepted the
science that says that human-caused emissions of carbon dioxide play the central role in rising
average global temperatures, increased sea levels, and coastal flooding – but threw out a lawsuit
calling for financial reparations from the oil companies for causing these problems. Why? And
what might the decision mean for other cases in other states, along similar lines, that are still in
the works? Two environmental lawyers, one of whom was in the courtroom for the tutorial,
explain.

In the past year, state and local governments across the
United States have launched a new wave of litigation
seeking to hold fossil fuel companies liable for damages
caused by climate change. To date, 13 cities and counties
in California, Colorado, Washington, and New York have
filed lawsuits against major oil and gas producers such as
ExxonMobil, BP, Chevron, and Shell, and in July the state
of Rhode Island initiated its own legal proceedings, suing
over damages caused to its infrastructure and coastal
communities by climate change – the first time a US
state has done so.1 The basic argument underpinning
these suits is that these companies knowingly contributed
to climate change by extracting and selling fossil fuels,
obscuring the science of climate change, and fighting
policies aimed at mitigating climate change (Heede
2016) – and consequently they should therefore be held
accountable for some of the adaptation costs incurred by
governments. The plaintiffs are pursuing multiple state
law legal theories: public nuisance, private nuisance, negligence, trespass, failure to warn, and design defect,
among others.
These lawsuits raise interesting questions about causation and attribution of climate-related damages:
Whether and to what extent can we legally attribute
harmful impacts associated with climate change to
specific actors or conduct?
There is no easy answer to this question. The field of
climate change detection and attribution is rapidly
evolving, and attribution studies are increasingly capable of linking specific harmful events – such as hurricanes and wildfires – to climate change (Shulman
2017). But establishing a complete causal chain in a
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court of law that links greenhouse gas emissions from
fossil fuels extracted and sold by a particular company
to specific damages is a more challenging task. Linking
impacts to emitters is more challenging than linking
impacts to anthropogenic climate change. Such attribution involves identifying, with relative confidence, the
proportional contribution of the company’s fossil fuels
to changes in global atmospheric composition, extrapolating the proportional contribution to more localized impacts such as sea level rise, and then identifying
actual damages (e.g., physical damage to infrastructure)
that were caused by those impacts (as opposed to the
negligence of other actors). Further complicating this
inquiry is the fact that “responsibility” is not a purely
scientific concept: Even if scientists can attribute specific damages to emissions from fossil fuels produced
by a specific company, there are still questions about
how responsibility should be allocated between the
company that produced the fuels, the end users of
those fuels (e.g., electric utility companies, people driving cars), and other actors involved in the fossil fuel
supply and consumption chain.
Confronted with the complexities of climate science,
the federal judge overseeing the cases brought by San
Francisco and Oakland – William Alsup – scheduled a
tutorial in which he asked both sides to present the
history of climate science and “the best science now
available on global warming, glacier melt, sea rise, and
coastal flooding.” Judge Alsup asked the parties to
answer nine questions, such as “What are the main
sources of heat that account for the incremental rise
in temperature on Earth?”
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Figure 1. San ardo oil field in california, one of the state’s largest. photo courtesy of loco steve/wikimedia under creative commons
license. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/file:The_san_ardo_oil_field_from_the_coast_starlight._(6132948846).jpg.

And during the tutorial, the attorney for the oil
giant Chevron conceded that fossil fuel consumption
contributes to climate change and made the memorable
statement that: “Chevron accepts the consensus in the
scientific communities on climate change. . . There’s no
debate about climate science.”
Nonetheless, the attorney for Chevron insisted that
fossil fuel companies should not be held responsible for
harms associated with climate change. Had the case proceeded to trial, the parties would have had an opportunity
to dive much deeper into the scientific basis for attributing climate-related harms to these companies. But Judge
Alsup dismissed the case before it went to trial on
grounds wholly unrelated to the climate science.
The Verge summed it up in the headline: “Oil companies can’t be sued for climate change even though it’s
real, judge rules.” (Becker 2018)
Why this result?
Judge Alsup’s primary rationale for dismissal was that
the courts are not the proper place to deal with such
global issues as determining rights and assigning responsibility for the damages caused by fossil fuel use. Rather,
Judge Alsup believed that such matters should be
addressed by the executive and legislative (otherwise
known as the “political”) branches of government and
not the judiciary. The case brought by New York City has
since been dismissed on the same grounds.
Notably, neither decision is binding on other courts,
and the cities have either appealed or announced plans
to appeal. So it is possible that other government
plaintiffs will succeed and these initial decisions will
be reversed. Certainly, plaintiffs face an uphill battle:
Past attempts to hold fossil fuel companies liable for
these types of harms have all failed. But these new cases
pursue different legal theories and involve claims that
may not be controlled by any existing case precedent,
so it is possible that at least some will succeed.

Below we discuss the prospects for this new line of
cases, and in particular, whether other judges might
also conclude that the courts are not the appropriate
forums for addressing these issues.

What’s past is prologue: The federal cases that
failed
This is not the first time that state and local governments have sought to hold companies that profit from
the sale and consumption of fossil fuels liable for their
contributions to climate change. There are two noteworthy cases which set the stage for this new wave of
litigation: Connecticut v. American Electric Power
(AEP) and Kivalina v. ExxonMobil. The first was a
lawsuit brought by eight states and New York City
against several major power companies, seeking an
injunction which would require those companies to
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. The second
was a lawsuit brought by the Alaskan village of
Kivalina against major fossil fuel and power companies, seeking monetary damages for flooding caused by
climate change. The plaintiffs in both cases alleged that
the emissions generated by the defendants’ conduct
constituted a public nuisance under federal common
law. (The complaints in both cases also raised state law
claims, but they were never decided.)
The phrase “common law” refers to the legal standards and principles articulated through judicial decisions, as opposed to statutes and regulations. A “public
nuisance” is a common law wrongful act, or “tort,”
defined as “an unreasonable interference with a right
common to the general public.” For many years, courts
have recognized that water pollution, air pollution, and
other environmental harms may qualify as public nuisances. The factors courts will consider in this analysis
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are: (a) whether the conduct involves a significant
interference with the public’s health, safety, peace,
comfort or convenience; (b) whether the conduct is
proscribed by law; or (c) whether the conduct is of a
continuing nature or has produced a permanent or
long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has
reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public
right to health, safety, peace, comfort or convenience.
Both AEP and Kivalina were ultimately dismissed
based on the doctrine of “legislative displacement,”
which bars the application of federal common law
when a federal statute directly addresses the question
at issue. The basic idea is that judge-made laws should
only be used to fill gaps in the legal regimes established
by the political branches of government. Regarding the
public nuisance claim in AEP, the Supreme Court held
that plaintiffs could not pursue a public nuisance claim
against emitters under federal common law because
Congress had already authorized the Environmental
Protection Agency to regulate those emissions under
the Clean Air Act. The Kivalina case was subsequently
dismissed by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals on the
same grounds.
AEP and Kivalina effectively foreclosed opportunities to use the federal common law as the basis for
suing emitters of greenhouse gases in the United States.
Recognizing this, the plaintiffs in this new line of cases
are attempting to use state common law as the basis for
their claims. But as discussed below, some of the cases
– including the Bay Area and New York City cases –
have been converted into federal cases on the grounds
that claims of a global scope should be governed by
federal law. These will likely fare worse than those that
are decided under state law.

The new wave of climate liability lawsuits
On 17 July 2017, three local governments in California
(San Mateo County, Marin County, and the city of
Imperial Beach) filed lawsuits against 20 fossil fuel
companies seeking to hold them liable for climate
change-related damages under California state law.
The factual and legal allegations in these complaints
differ in some respects from those raised in AEP and
Kivalina. In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that these
companies had committed multiple state common law
violations, including: public nuisance – an unreasonable interference with a right common to the public;
private nuisance – an unreasonable interference with
the use and enjoyment of private property (or in this
case, the municipal property owned and managed by
the plaintiffs); negligence – the failure to exercise due
care, resulting in damage or injury to another party;
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design defect – a problem with a product’s design that
makes it inherently dangerous or useless (in this case,
the fossil fuels are the product and the emissions
impacts are the defect); failure to warn – the failure
to provide adequate warning of a product defect; and
trespass – a knowing physical intrusion onto another
person’s property.
The plaintiffs alleged that the conduct giving rise to
these violations was not only the production and marketing of fossil fuels (and their corresponding emissions impacts), but also the fact that these companies
knew that their product was harmful, continued to
promote it anyway, and engaged in a prolonged disinformation campaign aimed at confusing the public and
preventing regulators from taking action to control
fossil fuel use.
Since then, similar lawsuits have been filed by the
cities of San Francisco, Oakland, Richmond, and Santa
Cruz; the county of Santa Cruz; New York City; the
city of Boulder, the county of Boulder, and the county
of San Miguel in Colorado; King County in
Washington; Baltimore; and the state of Rhode Island.
All of the government plaintiffs have framed their cases
as involving violations of state tort law, but the fossil
fuel company defendants have argued that the cases
implicate federal law and have been fighting to have
the cases removed to federal court and considered
under federal legal doctrines – where they believe
they stand a better chance of victory – and dismissed.
While the cases involve similar factual allegations,
one important distinction is that the lawsuits brought
by San Francisco and Oakland rested exclusively on a
theory of public nuisance, whereas the other lawsuits
rely on some combination of the legal theories noted
above as well as some other theories (the Colorado
communities are alleging unjust enrichment and violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, and
Rhode Island is alleging impairment of public trust
resources and a violation of the State Environmental
Rights Act).
The lawsuits brought by San Francisco and Oakland
were consolidated and successfully removed to federal
court by the defendants. The federal judge overseeing
the case (William Alsup, as noted above) held that the
plaintiffs’ public nuisance claims were “necessarily governed by federal law” because a “uniform standard of
decision is necessary to deal with the issues raised in
plaintiffs’ complaint.” Notably, another federal judge –
the one overseeing the case brought by the counties of
Marin and San Mateo and the city of Imperial Beach –
reached the opposite conclusion and remanded the
cases back to state court. Aspects of that decision are
now being appealed.
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In June, Judge Alsup granted the defendants’ motion
to dismiss the re-branded federal public nuisance
claims brought by San Francisco and Oakland, along
with the state law claims. As noted above, his decision
is not controlling on other courts but may provide
some insight into how other judges might decide
these issues.
Judge Alsup brought attention to the case when he
asked the parties to participate in the “climate science
tutorial” aimed at educating him about the scientific
underpinnings of climate change. But as previously
noted, the science discussion had little impact on the
decision; Judge Alsup stated in the first sentence of his
analysis that “[t]he issue is not over science.” Rather,
the issue – in his opinion – was about precedent, and
the separation of powers between Congress, the White
House, and the judiciary.
One threshold question was whether the controlling
rule in AEP and Kivalina – that federal common law
claims of public nuisance based on greenhouse gas
emissions were displaced by the Clean Air Act’s grant
of authority to EPA to regulate those emissions –
would also control the outcome of these cases. Judge
Alsup determined it did, at least to the extent that the
complained – of behavior occurred within the United
States, because ultimately the harms were caused by
greenhouse gas emissions. However, Judge Alsup also
noted that the complaints added a dimension that was
not addressed in AEP or Kivalina – specifically, that
some of the conduct and emissions contributing to the
alleged nuisance occurred outside of the United States
and thus could not be regulated under the Clean Air
Act. Here, Judge Alsup held that the claims were “foreclosed by the need for federal courts to defer to the
legislative and executive branches when it comes to
such international problems” as climate change. He
concluded that:
This order fully accepts the vast scientific consensus
that the combustion of fossil fuels has materially
increased atmospheric carbon dioxide levels, which
has in turn increased the median temperature of the
planet and accelerated sea level rise. But questions of
how to appropriately balance these worldwide negatives against the worldwide positives of the energy
itself, and how to allocate the pluses and minuses
among the nations of the world, demand the expertise
of our environmental agencies, our diplomats, our
Executive, and at least the Senate. Nuisance suits in
various United States judicial districts regarding conduct worldwide are far less likely to solve the problem
and, indeed, could interfere with reaching a worldwide
consensus.

Judge Alsup thus dismissed the case based on separation of powers principles. He did not, however,

explicitly address two judicial doctrines that are commonly used by courts to determine whether adjudication of claims would violate the separation of powers:
the political question doctrine and foreign affairs preemption. San Francisco has stated its intent to appeal
the decision (Schwartz 2018).
The following month, a district judge in New York,
John F. Keenan, dismissed the lawsuit brought by New
York City on the same grounds. Judge Keenan issued a
single decision holding that the claims raised by New
York City were governed by federal common law, that
the claims alleging harms from domestic emissions
were displaced by the Clean Air Act, and that the
claims alleging harms from defendants’ foreign conduct would interfere with the separation of powers,
particularly the foreign policy powers of other
branches. (More on these doctrines is below.) Like
Judge Alsup, Judge Keenan did not specifically evaluate
foreign affairs preemption or the political question
doctrines before reaching his conclusion that the
separation of powers doctrine barred review of this
case. New York City plans to appeal the decision
(Drugmand 2018).
Both Judge Alsup and Judge Keenan decided not to
address these doctrines. But the doctrines could still be
considered relevant to the cases. For example, the analysis in both decisions directly implicated questions
that are often resolved through application of specific
criteria embedded within these two doctrines. We discuss these further in the next section.

Future prospects for government plaintiffs
There are several reasons to think that other judges –
including the appellate judges that review the two
decisions dismissing these cases – may take a different
stance on whether the separation of powers doctrine
bars judicial review of federal public nuisance claims,
as well as state tort claims. To understand why, one
should analyze the case applying the criteria used by
the federal courts for political questions or foreign
affairs preemption. One can also look to differences
in state law treatment of the separation of powers
doctrine to understand why cases that are allowed to
remain in state court might be decided differently.
The political question doctrine is commonly used to
determine whether the court system is an appropriate
forum for adjudicating a particular federal claim in
light of the separation of powers principles. The
Supreme Court has identified specific factors for determining whether a plaintiff has presented a political
question best left to the other branches – such as
whether there are judicially manageable standards for
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resolving the case, and whether judicial resolution of
the case would disrespect the other branches of government. The Supreme Court has noted that unless one
of those factors is clearly implicated, there should be no
dismissal on political question grounds.
Notably, before the AEP case was dismissed by the
Supreme Court due to legislative displacement, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals specifically applied
these factors to the plaintiff’s nuisance claim and concluded that it was not a political question. The court
noted that “federal courts have successfully adjudicated
complex common law public nuisance cases for over a
century” and cited many examples of cases where “federal courts employed familiar public nuisance precepts,
grappled with complex scientific evidence, and resolved
the issues presented, based on a fully developed
record.” The court thus concluded that AEP was an
“ordinary tort suit” that could be adjudicated based on
well-established common law standards.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals also found that
there was no “unified policy on greenhouse gas emissions” and that “[a]llowing this litigation where there is
a lack of a unified policy does not demonstrate a lack of
respect for the political branches, contravene a relevant
political decision already made, or result in multifarious pronouncements that would embarrass the
nation.”
On review, the Supreme Court did not think the
political question doctrine “or any other threshold
obstacle” barred judicial review of the case. The
Second Circuit’s analysis of the political question doctrine was therefore left in place and may prove persuasive to other judges reviewing this new line of cases.
The other doctrine that could be used to evaluate
defendants’ separation of powers arguments – foreign
affairs preemption or displacement – is typically used
by courts to evaluate whether a state or local law is
preempted by the constitutional commitment of foreign affairs powers to the federal government. The
doctrine is relevant to the municipal lawsuits insofar
as the separation of powers arguments raised by defendants in their motions to dismiss are largely based on
assertions that judicial resolution of these cases would
impermissibly interfere with the foreign affairs powers
of the executive and legislative branches.
The standards for foreign affairs preemption have
never been articulated that clearly, but the Supreme
Court has provided some guidance on how to determine whether a particular law is preempted under this
doctrine. In particular, the Court has held that a state
law is preempted where there is a “clear conflict” with
US foreign policy, as articulated in executive agreements, treaties, or statutes. Such a conflict would exist
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“where it is impossible for a private party to comply”
with both state law and federal law on a particular
foreign affairs matter. A law may also be preempted if
it authorizes or requires entities other than Congress
and the president to engage in the conduct of foreign
policy or otherwise impairs the federal government’s
ability to conduct foreign policy. These preemption
rulings have all been issued in the context of state
statutes, but similar principles could be applied to displace common law actions as well (Merrill 2005).
There is some overlap between the foreign affairs
preemption/displacement analysis and the political
question analysis – for both inquiries, a court must
address whether judicial resolution of the case would
interfere with the execution of core foreign policy
functions of other branches of government.
Recognizing this, the Second Circuit in AEP confronted and quickly dismissed a foreign affairs displacement claim, noting that “[t]his argument – essentially
that plaintiff’s federal common law cause of action has
been displaced by the president’s conduct of foreign
affairs – simply reiterates their political question argument and must be rejected for similar reasons”
(Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co 2011).
The decisions to dismiss the lawsuits brought by San
Francisco, Oakland, and New York largely rested on
the judges’ belief that adjudication would violate the
delegation of foreign affairs powers to other branches
of government, although as noted above, neither judge
explicitly discussed this doctrine or the underlying case
law. Other reviewing courts may likewise focus on
considerations pertaining to foreign policy. It is difficult to predict what outcomes they will reach. A court
might take the same approach as the Second Circuit in
AEP and conclude that judicial resolution of these
claims would not conflict with US foreign policy
because there is no coherent or unified US foreign
policy on climate change. (On the one hand, we are
parties to both the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the
Paris Agreement; on the other hand, President Trump
has stated his intention to withdraw from the Paris
Agreement and is otherwise working to undermine
the objectives of the UNFCCC). Alternatively, a court
might conclude that the Senate ratification of the
UNFCCC is a sufficiently coherent articulation of US
foreign policy on climate change but that the adjudication of these disputes does not conflict with that policy
or impair the ability of our federal government to
participate in UNFCCC negotiations. (A court might
even find that holding those companies liable for emissions could advance the goals of the UNFCCC and
improve the US position in UNFCCC negotiations.)
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A court could also reach the opposite conclusion, finding that the claims cannot be heard by a federal court
either because they directly conflict with the Trump
administration’s foreign policy on climate change (as
embodied by the decision to withdraw from the Paris
Agreement and roll back federal emission standards) or
would undermine the federal government’s position in
UNFCCC negotiations.

climate change attribution, will become far more
important. But at this preliminary stage, the focus
is on prudential and political rather than scientific
considerations, in particular, whether courts are the
appropriate branch of government to determine
rights and assign responsibilities for the damages
caused by fossil fuels.

Note
What does the future hold?
So far, we have focused on how other federal judges
deciding these cases under federal law might
approach the separation of powers analysis. Some
cases, such as the lawsuits brought by Marin and
San Mateo and the city of Imperial Beach, appear
likely to stay in state court and be decided under
state law. Separation of powers principles play out
differently under state law. Consider the example of
California: The state courts have developed their
own separation of powers jurisprudence based on
the state constitution, which holds that a violation
of the doctrine only occurs when the actions of one
branch of government “defeat or materially impair”
the core powers or functions of another branch.
Under this standard, it is permissible for one
branch of government to undertake actions that
“significantly affect those [actions] of another
branch” so long as the acting branch does not prevent other branches from exercising core functions
delegated to them by the state constitution. There is
room to argue that the adjudication of the legal
claims raised against fossil fuel companies – and
the potential for a verdict holding fossil fuel companies liable for costs associated with climate
change – would not materially impair the ability
of the state legislative and executive branches to
execute their own lawmaking and regulatory functions with respect to climate change. To the contrary, a judge might conclude that such judicial
action would complement and supplement the programs enacted by other branches of the state
government.
If judges determine that the separation of powers
doctrine and related considerations do not bar adjudication of these cases, the plaintiffs will still face
challenges – such as arguments that federal statutes
establishing domestic energy policy and authorizing
fossil fuel production preempt common law claims,
and the challenge of linking the conduct of fossil
fuel companies to specific on-the-ground impacts
that are harming the plaintiffs. In the latter context,
scientific questions, particularly those pertaining to

1. City of Imperial Beach v. Chevron Corp. (2017); City of
Oakland v. BP P.L.C. (2017); City of Santa Cruz v.
Chevron Corp. (2017); County of Marin v. Chevron
Corp. (2017); County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp.
(2017); County of Santa Cruz v. Chevron Corp. (2017);
People of the State of California v. BP P.L.C. (2017a);
People of the State of California v. BP P.L.C. (2017b);
City of Richmond v. Chevron Corp. (2018); Board of
County Commissioners of Boulder County v. Suncor
Energy (2018); City of New York v. BP P.L.C. (2018);
State of Rhode Island v. Chevron (2018).
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